South-East Asia
Fighting rebellion the wrong way

Jun 29th 2006 | BANGKOK AND BULACAN PROVINCE, PHILIPPINES
From The Economist print edition
The Philippines and Thailand are getting increasingly keen on waging “war” on domestic unrest



THE boundaries between rebellion, terrorism and criminality can be fuzzy in South-East Asia. Rebels supposedly struggling for local self-rule or a juster society may be enriching themselves through extortion and kidnapping. And factions within such insurgencies sometimes help or are helped by terrorist groups with bolder aims—like creating an Islamic “superstate”—and deadlier methods than those the rebels might adopt.

This makes it hard for the region's governments to know how to deal with insurgents. Their stock response has often been to launch a new “war” on them. Such military-led campaigns, though, may be motivated mainly by a need to be seen to be doing something rather than nothing; or by a desire to divert attention from other political problems. They rarely succeed. Often, by tacitly sanctioning brutality by the security forces, they make things worse.

So it is not encouraging that, in recent days, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo of the Philippines has given her security forces a two-year deadline and an extra 1 billion pesos ($19m) to wipe out the communist New People's Army (NPA). Nor does it augur well that Thaksin Shinawatra, the equally embattled prime minister of Thailand (see article), has just given his country's army chief, Sonthi Boonyaratglin, “full authority” to quell a two-year-old Muslim insurgency in the country's southern provinces.

The Philippines' communist uprising affects most of its provinces and has caused perhaps 40,000 deaths since it started in the 1960s. Talks between the NPA and the government broke down two years ago. Since then the rebels have attacked repeatedly, raiding police stations to steal guns and bombing businesses which refuse to pay the “revolutionary taxes” demanded of them. Though nothing like on the scale of the 1960s and 1970s, the problem refuses to go away.

However, it is unclear what reasons Mrs Arroyo has for launching a fresh assault on the NPA now—other than cynical ones. Her announcement hogged the headlines ahead of her opponents' launch this week of fresh attempts to impeach her on vote-rigging charges. The president followed it with a visit to the Vatican on June 26th, to receive the pope's blessing for her recent abolition of the death penalty.

But just as she is abolishing judicial executions, Mrs Arroyo risks giving tacit support to extra-judicial killings by the security forces sent to root out the NPA. Josefina de la Cruz, the governor of Bulacan province, north of Manila, says there are already three contingents of soldiers conducting anti-insurgency operations there, at least one of which does not answer to the local army command. The shadowy group's leader may be linked to the murders of five farm workers in February, says Mrs De la Cruz.

While waging war on the NPA, Mrs Arroyo's government continues to negotiate a peace deal, supposedly to be signed in September, with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). This group, fighting for greater autonomy for the country's mainly Muslim southern provinces, has observed a ceasefire since 2003. However, a 1996 peace deal with another rebel group, from which the MILF had split, failed to end the south's violence. Unless the government does more to reduce poverty and improve governance there, the rebellion may just continue under other names—such as that of Abu Sayyaf, a small group linked to al-Qaeda which has carried out kidnappings and bombings in the region.

Unlike that in the Philippines, Thailand's insurgency is clearly getting worse. Civilians are now regularly being attacked, not just the security forces. Nobody knows how many rebel groups there are in the three mainly-Muslim provinces bordering Malaysia, but some are clearly well organised. On June 15th they let off 50 bombs across the region. This week, militants killed five members of a security team deployed to protect teachers, whom the rebels associate with the Thai state.

The Thai security forces have made things worse by handling the uprising appallingly. In the most notorious case, in 2004, around 80 Muslim protesters were suffocated after being crammed into trucks by the army. An official commission was set up last year to propose solutions to the conflict. On receiving its report, in early June, Mr Thaksin's government pledged to follow its recommendations. These included compensating people ill-treated by the security forces and officially recognising the Malay dialect spoken in the three provinces. Since Mr Sonthi is a Muslim, there were hopes that his appointment as counter-insurgency supremo would signal a change for the better.

However, the signs already look bad. Mr Thaksin has rejected the proposal to recognise the southern dialect and is already grumbling publicly that Mr Sonthi is not doing enough. This suggests he might last no longer than the succession of short-lived supremos that preceded him.

Given the blurred boundaries between rebels with a local cause, terrorists waging global war and self-enriching criminals, signing peace pacts with insurgents' leaders is no guarantee of peace. But the so-far successful peace process in Indonesia's Aceh province shows that governments tend to achieve more by making sincere efforts to discuss local grievances and rein in their armies than by letting slip the dogs of war. As recently as 2003, the Indonesian government was still trying to quell separatism in Aceh with force. Only after a new president, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, came to power and accepted the need to make a political deal, was an agreement struck that has led to the rebels disarming and to peace in the province.

Didn't they just do a series of "anniversary" bombings in Thailand?
Seems it heatig up in the South.

The rebellion within Southern Thailand is something that isn't going to go away. Throwing more troops and increasing the level of suppression will do nothing but exacerbate the problem. Sadly Thaksin Shinawatra's government seem intent on meeting violence with violence. After having set up a the 48-member National Reconciliation Commission, and initially welcoming their report Thaksin now seems intent on ignoring the recommendations made. The following is taken from the executive summary.

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Diagnosis of the Problem

Thai society must begin with the understanding that although the conflict in the southern border provinces may have important causes at the structural level similar to the problems of rural Thailand elsewhere i.e. poverty, brutal competition for natural resources under pressure from external economic forces, poor educational quality, injustice at the hands of state officials, and weaknesses in the judicial process in this conflict has been heightened and made more dangerous by differences in religion, ethnicity, language and the understanding of history, issues which are easily used as justifications for violence. Defeating the violence in the southern border provinces therefore requires for the most part political measures that aim to rearrange the relationship between the state and the people, as well as between the majority and minority both in the southern region and throughout the country, in order to solve the problem at the structural level and fight the justifications for violence at the cultural level.

The NRC is of the view that economic factors such as poverty or injustices are related to the problem of violence, as they are conditions that breed sympathy and support both within and outside the region, and can also be used as pretexts for violent struggle. At the same time, the diagnosis is clear that religion is not the cause of the violence. It is, however, related to the violence as a justification which some groups use in attempting to legitimize their violent methods. Notably, religion is not the only legitimizing factor being used, but the history of Pattani and Malay ethnic identity are also used to legitimize the use of violence. Violence in the southern border provinces arises from three layered conditions:

First is the level of the individual.

These are the unconstrained abuses of administrative power, the use of violence by militants, and
retaliation by violent means on the part of state authorities.

Second is the structural level.

These are:

• Injustices arising from the existing judicial process and administrative system.
• Economic weakness in the southern border provinces where number of poor people are high, as pressures on natural resources drive villagers towards poverty with no alternatives.
• An education system which is not able to empower the majority of the people to overcome a variety of social challenges, both worldly and religious.
• The majority of the people are Thai Muslims of Malay descent, while the Thai Buddhist population is declining steadily.
• The problems are occurring at the geographical juncture between Thailand’s southern border and Malaysia, throwing into sharp focus the differences in quality of life between the people of the two countries.

The third level consists of cultural conditions.

These include the specific religious and ethnic traits particular to the region, namely, Islam, the Malay language and the history of Pattani. These are social conditions that ostensibly legitimize the use of violence, or persuade considerable numbers of people to accept or agree with the perpetrators of violence. All of this allows militants in the southern border provinces to use ethnic and religious factors to legitimize their use of violence in their attempt to achieve their goals in the name of Malay Muslim identity.

Prognosis

Based on data of violent incidents taken place during the past two years from the beginning of 2004 to the end of 2005, if other conditions do not change, the prognosis is as follows:

1. Although there was a lower incidence of violence towards the end of 2005, there is no overall trend that violence will decline steadily.
2. The use of explosives is rising. A review of the latter half of 2005 finds rise over that of arson.
3. More ordinary people will become victims of violence.
4. Violence will continue to affect economic conditions in the area.
5. The relations between the State and the majority of the people in the southern border provinces are at a disturbing level. Thai Muslims of Malay descent do not trust the state because they are uncertain to what extent the violence is the handiwork of state officials.
6. Cultural institutions that used to bind people of diverse backgrounds together have weakened. People of different outlooks who co-exist in the same society now regard one another as strangers or even enemies. This divisiveness causes people to become attached to violence, a direct result of fear and mutual suspicion.

It is these conditions that make the choice of violence as a means to solve the problem not only a misguided choice, but a choice that will also worsen the situation. The way out for Thai society, in order to stop this dangerous trend, is to work towards reconciliation as a viable alternative.

Reconciliation Measures as Therapy for the Problem of Violence Reconciliatory Political Measures

The NRC proposes the passing of The Peaceful Reconciliation in the Southern Border Provinces (Dousing the fire in the South Act) to solve the problem of violence, and build lasting peace and
reconciliation in the southern border provinces.

The NRC is of the view that in order for the problem of violence in the three southern border provinces to be successfully resolved, part of the solution would come from mechanisms that would allow for unified state strategies in the region. Another part would be mechanisms that strengthen the civil society sector. However, such mechanisms are currently lacking or weak. The Peaceful Reconciliation in the Southern Border Provinces Act (Dousing the fire in the South Act) is therefore proposed as a tool to solve this problem. This Act should establish three bodies to serve as instruments to solve the violence in the southern border provinces. They are:

1. Peaceful Strategic Administrative Center for Southern Border Provinces (PSAC), tasked with the following functions:

• Promote understanding of the situation and methods to solve the problem in all government agencies, among people in the region, in Thai society at large, and with the international community.
• Build coherence in the strategies of all involved agencies, at the levels of policy, command and operation.
• Recommend the transfer of incompetent government officials out of the area.
• Promote the development of a justice system and judicial process which will enhance peace and reconciliation in the region.
• Put an end to any action or policy by any government agency that conflicts with the PSAC’s strategy, with the authority to report any such action to the government.
• Promote the development of an educational system and socioeconomic development that is consistent with the region’s culture and religion and with a sufficiency economy, including the decentralization of power to local communities, as mandated by the constitution, so that they may plan and drive development towards sufficiency, balance, harmony and happiness.
• Strengthen civil society mechanisms to enable participation in policymaking, development planning and checking the exercise of state power, according to Article 76 of the constitution.
• Provide annual recommendations and reports to the government and Parliament.

2. Southern Border Provinces Area Development Council

This Council will not exercise any state or administrative authority, but will promote the people’s learning process and people’s participation, including a mutual learning process involving all parties, to lead to justice, improvement of the educational system and socioeconomic development in line with local culture and religion and sufficiency economy principles. The Council shall provide recommendations on the management of natural resources, monitor budgetary expenditures by government agencies in the area, and decentralize power to local communities as mandated in the constitution, so that they are strong and capable of planning and driving development towards sufficiency, balance, justice, harmony and happiness.

3. Fund For Healing and Reconciliation

A Fund For Healing and Reconciliation should be set up under the Act, as an organization with supporting legislation, a sizeable budget allocated by the government, and an independent fund management committee. The Southern Border Provinces Area Development Council may be assigned to nominate the fund committee members.

Immediate Reconciliation Measures

1. The NRC proposes that the Thai Military set up a Peace Force (Santisena) Unit, a special unarmed force comprised of civilians, military and police in the discharge of its specific duties, namely, to keep existing conflict from spiraling into violence.

2. The NRC proposes that the state clearly demonstrate that it chooses to engage in dialogue with the militants, and ensures the coherence of security policy on this matter.

3. The NRC proposes that the government deal decisively with state officials against whom abuse-of-power complaints have been substantiated. It is important that only officials with integrity and understanding of the particular characteristics of the people in the southern border provinces be assigned to the region.

Sustainable Reconciliation Measures

1. The NRC proposes that reform be undertaken of the systems to manage land and resources, as well as related property rights, particularly in public areas, such as land for public use, bodies of water, coastal seas, peat swamp forests, and community forests. Local communities should systematically be given more rights than before, so that such rights no longer belong only to individuals, legal entities, local organizations and government agencies. The community should have communal rights to allocate the use of lands, public areas and local natural resources. The government should expedite the submission of the Community Forest Bill to Parliament for consideration.

2. Solve unemployment problem in the southern border provinces through concerted public and private sector efforts. Solutions should be diverse and consistent with the needs of the people in the area.

3. Enhance the efficiency of the judicial process based on truth, the rule of law, and accountability, and strengthen society by allowing the public to participate in the upholding of justice through:

• Building confidence in the judicial process
• Building coherence in policymaking on the integrated administration of justice in the southern border provinces
• Enhance the efficiency of the implementation of the judicial process according to the rule of law
• Develop an effective system to monitor the implementation of the judicial process and the healing of affected parties
• Adjust the attitudes and practices of officials in the justice system
• Enhance the role of civil society in the judicial process and develop alternative judicial processes

4. Improve the Islamic legal system in the context of the southern border provinces by considering the partial use of shariah law in the region.

5. Amend the Administration of Islamic Bodies Act, B.E. 2540 (1997) to ensure consistency, transparency and clarity on issues of management and religious donations.

6. Maintain diversity in the education system, enhance the efficiency of secular education and give importance to oversea Thai students.

7. nonviolence as the main approach of state policies in dealing with violence in the southern border provinces by:

• Issuing a Cabinet Resolution expediting the follow-up of the implementation of Prime Ministerûs Office Order No. 187/2546, on the use of nonviolent means in solving conflicts, and requiring all ministries to regularly report progress in its implementation, and to widely disseminate such reports to the public.
• Setting up a committee responsible for reviewing laws that may conflict with the nonviolent approach, drafting legislation to amend such laws, and drawing up measures to promote nonviolent means.
• Having the Office of the National Security Council expedite the formulation of a security strategy for the southern border provinces in continuation of the 1999-2003 policy as a key component of the nonviolent approach, and having the NSC closely follow up on the implementation of this strategy.
• Supporting the development of relations between Muslims in Thailand and those in the Muslim world by giving importance to peaceful solutions based on Islam that are acceptable to the Muslim world.
• Promoting diplomatic relations between Thailand and neighboring Muslim countries to foster immunity against regional violence, with emphasis on continuity to avoid any gap that might result fromchanges in national political leadership, particularly in relations with Malaysia. Moreover, it is important to expedite an understanding of the problem and Thailandûs approach to its solution among key Islamic international organizations.

8. Promoting cultural diversity throughout all regions of Thailand.

9. Promoting nonviolent means of solving conflicts throughout the country as part of the Thai peopleûs way of life.

10.Declaring Pattani-Malay as an additional working language in the southern border provinces to facilitate communications between the people and state authorities.

11.Organize dialogues for reconciliation.

12.Build cultural immunity against violence by increasing tolerance or forbearance by arranging for people in the minority and majority to meet in official or semi-official settings conducive to a genuine exchange of views, including learning to listen to differing viewpoints and finding common solutions together.

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The full pdf file can be found here: Report of The National Reconciliation Commission

Thank you, one of the few quality posts I've found on this forum so far.